Personal profile
Biography
In 2005, I completed my Ph.D. at the University of Sheffield, where my supervisors were Rosanna Keefe and Chris Hookway. Supported by an award from the Analysis Trust, I spent the 2005-6 academic year at the Faculty of Philosophy at Cambridge, continuing my research. I became a Lecturer at Manchester in 2006, and a Senior Lecturer in 2010.
I spent the 2009-10 academic year on research leave, thanks to an AHRC Research Leave award.
From 2011 to 2014, Chris Daly and I directed a research project entitled The Foundations of Ontology, funded by the AHRC.
In 2016 I became an Editor of Analysis. I stepped down in 2024. I was previously an Associate Editor of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Research interests
I am an ontologist: I try to work out what exists. I have a particular interest in debates over the existence of mathematical objects, possible worlds, composite objects, and propositions. My Cambridge "Element" Abstract Objects is a short, opinionated introduction to the debate over the existence of abstract objects.
Because I share Quine's "taste for desert landscapes", I have tended to explore theories which posit less rather than more, which has led me to think about paraphrase, pretence, fictionalism, and error theory. My book Truth Without Truths brings some of these ideas into discussions of truth and paradox.
I am currently working on the significance of higher-order logic for metaphysics.
Other research
Publications
Links to published versions (PhilPapers)
Penultimate drafts of many of my papers are available on PhilPapers. If you have trouble getting hold of any of my papers, just email me.
Opportunities
I would be delighted to work with graduate students who share any of my research interests. Just drop me an email to discuss. Possible topics include: the indispensability argument, nominalism, fictionalism, pretence theories, truth, propositions, philosophical method, metaontology. For funding opportunities available to students wishing to do a PhD in any of these areas, please seehttp://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/subjects/philosophy/postgraduate-research/phd-funding/.
Other teaching information
Teaching 2025-26:
Metaphysics (year 3 UG)
Research Skills (MA)
Landmark Papers in Analytic Philosophy (MA)
Further information
Recent talks
‘How higher-order metaphysics weakens the case for propositions’, online seminar, NOTA (The Nature of the Objects of Thought and Assertion), July 2025
‘Response to my critics’, VICTR (Virtual International Consortium for Truth Research) online author-meets-critics event on Truth Without Truths, March 2025
‘A Priorian solution to a Priorian paradox’, University of Southampton, March 2025
‘Paradox without propositions’, University of Lancaster, February 2025
‘A Priorian solution to a Priorian paradox’, University of Turin, Italy, October 2024
‘A Priorian solution to a Priorian problem’, University of Valencia, Spain, May 2024
‘A Priorian solution to a Priorian problem’, University of Manchester, October 2023
‘Alethic nihilism as an error theory’, Who is Afraid of Philosophy? 15th Conference of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy (SIFA), Alessandria, Italy, September 2023
‘Can inconsistent concepts be analysed?’, Concepts and Their Uses: Symposium of the Swiss Philosophical Society, Bern, Switzerland, August 2023
External positions
Co-Editor, Analysis
Sept 2021 → Aug 2024
Editor, Analysis
Sept 2017 → Aug 2021
AHRC Peer Review College Member
Jan 2017 → Dec 2022
Co-Editor, Analysis
Sept 2016 → Aug 2017
Associate Editor, Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Sept 2009 → May 2016
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Truth Without Truths
Liggins, D., 10 Oct 2024, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 208 p.Research output: Book/Report › Book › peer-review
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Abstract Objects
Liggins, D., 29 Feb 2024, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 58 p. (Elements in Metaphysics)Research output: Book/Report › Book › peer-review
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Fictionalism
Liggins, D., Oct 2021, Oxford University Press.Research output: Other contribution › peer-review
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Should a higher-order metaphysician believe in properties?
Liggins, D., 4 Jun 2021, (E-pub ahead of print) In: Synthese. 199, 3-4, p. 10017–10037 21 p.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Open Access -
Against hermeneutic fictionalism
Liggins, D., 2020, Fictionalism in Philosophy. Armour-Garb, B. & Kroon, F. (eds.). New York: Oxford University PressResearch output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review
Open AccessFile139 Downloads (Pure)
Projects
- 1 Finished