A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly

Rabah Amir; Igor Evstigneev

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.010

A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly

Rabah Amir, Igor Evstigneev

Economics

The University of Iowa

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Abstract

The paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the standard Bertrand duopoly with a homogeneous product. The main condition is elementary, easy to interpret, and nests all known sufficient conditions in the literature.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	99-103
Number of pages	4
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	109
Early online date	15 Dec 2017
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.010
Publication status	Published - May 2018

Keywords

Price competition
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
weakly dominated strategy
non-monotonic demand.

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10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.010

Am-Ev-BertrandGEB-23-11-17Accepted author manuscript, 92.6 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

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abstract = "The paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the standard Bertrand duopoly with a homogeneous product. The main condition is elementary, easy to interpret, and nests all known sufficient conditions in the literature.",

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KW - Price competition

KW - uniqueness of Nash equilibrium

KW - weakly dominated strategy

KW - non-monotonic demand.

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JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

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A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly

Abstract

Keywords

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