A new perspective on the classical Cournot duopoly

Rabah Amir, Igor Evstigneev

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Abstract

The paper provides new conditions for the existence, uniqueness, and symmetry of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the classical Cournot duopoly.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Dynamics & Games
Volume4
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 4 Oct 2017

Keywords

  • Cournot duopoly
  • potential games
  • pure-strategy Nash equilibria
  • Existence
  • Uniqueness
  • Symmetry

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