@article{aff18c71fef84d2fa470ab9a7ccb28c8,
title = "A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux",
abstract = "Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: (1) the propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited; (2) intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence; and (3) certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of justification. This article presents a partial defence of descriptive evidentialism against these new arguments.",
keywords = "Intuitions, Metaphilosophy, Philosophical methodology, Evidence, Descriptive evidentialism, Epistemology of philosophy, Defence of intuitions",
author = "James Andow",
year = "2017",
month = jan,
day = "16",
doi = "10.1111/meta.12225",
language = "English",
volume = "48",
pages = "183--195",
journal = "Metaphilosophy",
issn = "0026-1068",
publisher = "John Wiley & Sons Ltd",
number = "1-2",
}