A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts, as proposed independently by Hawthorne (2002), Stalnaker (2002) and Braddon-Mitchell (2003), is used to undermine Chalmers's (1996) conceivability argument in a way that is compatible with our having the zombie intuition. The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) To remove current misconceptions concerning how the analysis is to be applied. It will be explained how there are two distinct ways the analysis can be used to undermine the conceivability argument. (2) To employ this exposition to defend the analysis from objections leveled against it by Chalmers (2005) and Alter (2007).
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)227-253
Number of pages27
JournalPhilosophical Papers
Volume43
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2 Jul 2014

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this