A Representationalist Argument Against Contemporary Panpsychism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Contemporary panpsychists, such as Lockwood (1991; 1993), Rosenberg (1999; 2004), and Maxwell (2002), argue that not only is the intrinsic nature of all physical matter phenomenal, but that this is so because the physical depends on the phenomenal.Most of us, including contemporary panpsychists, also acknowledge that our phenomenal experiences are, in some sense, representational. The aim of this paper is to use this well-conceded point that our phenomenal experiences are representational to cast doubt on contemporary panpsychism.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)105-123
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Consciousness Studies
Issue number5-6
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2013


Dive into the research topics of 'A Representationalist Argument Against Contemporary Panpsychism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this