Against an Argument for Objective Probabilities of Undetermined Choices

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Abstract

According to libertarianism about free will, at least some of the choices we make are free and undetermined. Many libertarians also accept the thesis that, before we make an undetermined choice, there is a nontrivial objective probability that we will make that choice. In the literature on free will, the ascription of objective probabilities is sometimes justified via an “Argument from Motivation,” which adverts to the fact that typically, in situations of choice, we are more motivated to choose some options over others. In this paper, I will examine this argument and I will argue that it is unsound, as one of its premises is at odds with a widely accepted principle governing the evolution of objective probabilities over time.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages12
JournalAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2023

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