An asymptotic analysis of strategic behavior for exchange economies

Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, Claudia Meo*

*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

We consider strategic market games associated to exchange economies both in a framework with no uncertainty and with asymmetric information. We address the asymptotic convergence of active Nash equilibria of strategic market games to Walrasian ones for general sequences of economies whose distribution of characteristics has compact support.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-25
Number of pages25
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume66
Issue number0
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 24 Jul 2017

Keywords

  • Asymmetric information
  • Convergence
  • Price taking
  • Strategic market games

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