An autopoietic investigation of how the market for corporate control protects stakeholder interests

David Williamson, Chengbo Gu, G. Lynch-Wood

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Although people may accept that a market for corporate control is necessary, the further claim that it protects stakeholder interests is more controversial. Some of this controversy arises from the implication that the market for corporate control must incorporate civil society concerns, to the degree that it then acts as a civil regulatory pressure to protect stakeholder interests. The justification for why this may indeed be the case draws upon autopoietic theory and incorporates three main arguments. These are the market for corporate control, to a degree, already protects stakeholder interests, the market for corporate control is responsive to civil regulatory pressure, and civil regulatory pressure is an inevitable form of regulatory oversight for many market transactions in developed pluralistic societies.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationhost publication
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2012
Event4th International Regulation and Governance Conference - University of Cambridge
Duration: 5 Sept 20126 Sept 2012

Conference

Conference4th International Regulation and Governance Conference
CityUniversity of Cambridge
Period5/09/126/09/12

Keywords

  • Market for Corporate Control, Stakeholders, Autopoietic Social Systems

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