An empirical test of the metacognitive model of obsessive-compulsive symptoms: Fusion beliefs, beliefs about rituals, and stop signals

Samuel G. Myers, Peter L. Fisher, Adrian Wells

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    The metacognitive model of obsessive-compulsive symptoms [Wells, A. (1997). Cognitive therapy of anxiety disorders: a practice manual and conceptual guide. Chichester, UK: Wiley] emphasizes three types of metacognitive knowledge in the etiology and maintenance of symptoms: thought fusion beliefs, beliefs about the need to perform rituals, and criteria that signal rituals can be stopped. We tested the model using a series of hierarchical regression analyses. Results showed that each metacognitive domain when entered in their hypothesized causal sequence explained incremental variance in two different measures of obsessive-compulsive symptoms, with worry controlled. These incremental relationships remained when non-metacognitive beliefs (e.g., responsibility and perfectionism) which have been linked to obsessive-compulsive symptoms in other theories were controlled. Results provide further support for the metacognitive model. © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)436-442
    Number of pages6
    JournalJournal of anxiety disorders
    Volume23
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - May 2009

    Keywords

    • Beliefs
    • Metacognitive model
    • Obsessive-compulsive symptoms

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