Another Look at Mode Intentionalism

Jonathan Mitchell

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


A central claim in contemporary philosophy of mind is that the
phenomenal character of experience is entirely determined by its content. In this paper, I consider an alternative I call Mode Intentionalism. According to this view, phenomenal character outruns content. It does so because the intentional mode contributes to the phenomenal character of the experience. Here I assess phenomenal contrast arguments in support of this view. I argue that the phenomenal contrast cases appealed to allow for interpretations which do not require positing intentional modes as phenomenologically manifest aspects of experience.
Original languageEnglish
Early online date12 Sept 2020
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 12 Sept 2020


  • Intentionalism
  • Phenomenology
  • Modes
  • Phenomenal Character


Dive into the research topics of 'Another Look at Mode Intentionalism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this