Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?

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Various studies have reported that moral intuitions about the permissibility of acts are subject to framing effects. This paper reports the results of a series of experiments which further examine the susceptibility of moral intuitions to framing effects. The main aim was to test recent speculation that intuitions about the moral relevance of certain properties of cases might be relatively resistent to framing effects. If correct, this would provide a certain type of moral intuitionist with the resources to resist challenges to the reliability of moral intuitions based on such framing effects. And, fortunately for such intuitionists, although the results can’t be used to mount a strident defence of intuitionism, the results do serve to shift the burden of proof onto those who would claim that intuitions about moral relevance are problematically sensitive to framing effects.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)115-141
Number of pages27
JournalReview of Philosophy and Psychology
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 3 Jul 2017


  • Intuitions
  • Moral intuitions
  • Ethics
  • Philosophy
  • Metaphilosophy
  • Epistemology of philosophy
  • Philosophical methods
  • Philosophical methodology
  • Moral epistemology
  • Intuitionism
  • Moral intuitionism
  • Framing effects


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