Using a sample of Brazilian listed firms for the period 1998-2004 we find evidence that revaluations of fixed assets are negatively related to future firm performance, prices and returns. We also find that the decision to revalue is negatively associated with scores on a Brazilian Corporate Governance Index (BCGI) and positively associated with indebtedness and illiquidity. Our results suggest that revaluations of fixed assets in Brazil are not designed to convey information to external users of financial statements but rather to improve equity positions - opportunistic motivations. Our evidence also corroborates the idea that firms that adopt superior voluntary governance arrangements are less likely to engage in actions designed to manipulate their financial statements. These results lend support to the recent amendment to the Company law which eliminated the revaluation option for Brazilian firms despite the current process of IFRS convergence. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd.
- Fair value
- IFRS adoption