Carbon emission reduction with regard to retailer's fairness concern and subsidies

This paper considers the impact of consumer environmental awareness (CEA), retailer's fairness concern, and government subsidies on the two echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer produces green products with carbon emission reduction. The government provides two types of alternative subsidies: a fixed subsidy (referred to as an F-type subsidy) or a discount subsidy (referred to as a D-type subsidy) to encourage the manufacturer to produce a product with a high carbon emission reduction rate. We aim to provide optimal solutions to the manufacturer and the retailer with regard to the retailer's fairness concern and government subsidies; thus we discuss four decision scenarios: the benchmark model without the fairness concern and subsidy, the model with the retailer's fairness concern, the model with fairness concern and the F-type subsidy, and the model with fairness concern and the D-type subsidy. We provide explicit solutions and numerical examples of the optimal carbon emission reduction rate, wholesale price, and retail price. Our study has four main findings: firstly, high consumer environmental awareness will benefit both the manufacturer and the retailer in the above four scenarios; secondly, the fairness concern and subsidy have a counter effect on the optimal strategies (the subsidy could alleviate the negative influence caused by retailer's fairness concern); thirdly, the government could subsidize the retailer when there is unfairness in the supply chain so that the manufacturer could produce a product with lower carbon emission; finally, using the subsidy related to the environmental quality will be more helpful for improving environment quality, especially when the government has a budget constraint.