CEO Inside Debt and Corporate Debt Maturity Structure

Viet Dang, Hieu V. Phan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

833 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper examines the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings and corporate debt maturity. We provide robust evidence that inside debt has a positive effect on short-maturity debt and that this effect is concentrated in financially unconstrained firms that face lower refinancing risk. Our analysis further shows that CEO inside debt helps reduce the cost of debt financing. Overall, our results indicate that managerial holdings of inside debt facilitate access to external debt financing and reduce refinancing risk, thus incentivizing managers to use less costly shorter term debt.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)38-54
JournalJournal of Banking & Finance
Volume70
Early online date10 Jun 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2016

Keywords

  • Debt maturity
  • Short-term debt
  • Inside debt
  • Pension
  • Deferred compensation

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'CEO Inside Debt and Corporate Debt Maturity Structure'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this