Choosing and Refusing: Doxastic Voluntarism and Folk Psychology

John Turri, David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


A standard view in contemporary philosophy is that belief is involuntary, either as a matter of conceptual necessity or as a contingent fact of human psychology. We present seven experiments on patterns in ordinary folk-psychological judgments about belief. The results provide strong evidence that voluntary belief is conceptually possible and, granted minimal charitable assumptions about folk-psychological competence, provide some evidence that voluntary belief is psychologically possible. We also consider two hypotheses in an attempt to understand why many philosophers have been tempted to view belief as involuntary: that belief is a prototype concept and that belief is a dual character concept. Altogether, our findings contribute to longstanding philosophical debates about the relationship between the will and the intellect, while also advancing scientific understanding of important social judgments.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2507-2537
Number of pages31
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number10
Early online date6 Sept 2017
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2018


  • Belief
  • Dual character concepts
  • Folk psychology
  • Involuntarism
  • The will
  • Voluntarism


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