Coalitions with Limited Coordination

Leonidas Koutsougeras

doi:DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01302-z

Coalitions with Limited Coordination

Leonidas Koutsougeras

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study economies endowed with a market structure, where coalitions can
form within each market but have no enforcement possibilities across markets. A standard cooperative game cannot be dened in this case. We develop a certain equilibrium notion which ties together the cores of the dierent markets. We provide an existence result and an application to economies with asymmetric information.

Original language	English
Journal	Economic Theory
Early online date	18 Aug 2020
DOIs	https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01302-z
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 18 Aug 2020

Keywords

core
multiple proposals
incomplete coordination

Access to Document

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01302-zLicence: CC BY

Cite this

@article{678a27f6829a4db69f72211ce29e865d,

title = "Coalitions with Limited Coordination",

abstract = "We study economies endowed with a market structure, where coalitions canform within each market but have no enforcement possibilities across markets. A standard cooperative game cannot be dened in this case. We develop a certain equilibrium notion which ties together the cores of the dierent markets. We provide an existence result and an application to economies with asymmetric information.",

keywords = "core, multiple proposals, incomplete coordination",

author = "Leonidas Koutsougeras",

year = "2020",

month = aug,

day = "18",

doi = "DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01302-z",

language = "English",

journal = "Economic Theory",

issn = "0938-2259",

publisher = "Springer New York",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Coalitions with Limited Coordination

AU - Koutsougeras, Leonidas

PY - 2020/8/18

Y1 - 2020/8/18

N2 - We study economies endowed with a market structure, where coalitions canform within each market but have no enforcement possibilities across markets. A standard cooperative game cannot be dened in this case. We develop a certain equilibrium notion which ties together the cores of the dierent markets. We provide an existence result and an application to economies with asymmetric information.

AB - We study economies endowed with a market structure, where coalitions canform within each market but have no enforcement possibilities across markets. A standard cooperative game cannot be dened in this case. We develop a certain equilibrium notion which ties together the cores of the dierent markets. We provide an existence result and an application to economies with asymmetric information.

KW - core

KW - multiple proposals

KW - incomplete coordination

U2 - DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01302-z

DO - DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01302-z

M3 - Article

SN - 0938-2259

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

ER -

Coalitions with Limited Coordination

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this