TY - JOUR
T1 - Collective Development of Flexible Capital Designs: The case of Future-proofing Infrastructure
AU - Gil, Nuno
AU - Biesek, Guilherme
AU - Freeman, James
N1 - The article has just been accepted for publication by IEEE transactions in Engineering Management. I believe it is the first article in press to deploy Ostrom's theory of collective action to look into the problem of planning large infrastructure projects. it is a mixed methods papers, and intelectually it is a break through in terms of deploying ostrom's work to illuminate a poorly understood phenomena around the creation of public goods
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - This mixed methods study investigates a dilemma that inter-organizational collectives formed to develop long-lived capital assets face at the project front-end: either invest in flexible designs that cope economically with change in requirements, this is design to evolve—at risk the extra costs upfront will not pay off if the uncertainties do not resolve favourably later on. Or endorse cheaper but more rigid designs—at risk of higher adaptation costs if the uncertainties do materialise in the future. Through an empirical study grounded in the British railway sector, we reveal that the collectives regularly engage in informal future-proofing discussions to address this dilemma. But faced with tight budgets, conflicting interests, and mutual ignorance, the different parties struggle to design in flexibility. Through lab experiments, and taking a flat governance structure as a given, we then unexpectedly find that a formal device to facilitate future proofing discussions has limited impact on the outcomes. Hence, we argue, a collective action problem is central to the inter-organizational development of flexible capital designs. We conclude by discussing how inter-organizational collectives can better exploit the value of design flexibility at the project front-end.
AB - This mixed methods study investigates a dilemma that inter-organizational collectives formed to develop long-lived capital assets face at the project front-end: either invest in flexible designs that cope economically with change in requirements, this is design to evolve—at risk the extra costs upfront will not pay off if the uncertainties do not resolve favourably later on. Or endorse cheaper but more rigid designs—at risk of higher adaptation costs if the uncertainties do materialise in the future. Through an empirical study grounded in the British railway sector, we reveal that the collectives regularly engage in informal future-proofing discussions to address this dilemma. But faced with tight budgets, conflicting interests, and mutual ignorance, the different parties struggle to design in flexibility. Through lab experiments, and taking a flat governance structure as a given, we then unexpectedly find that a formal device to facilitate future proofing discussions has limited impact on the outcomes. Hence, we argue, a collective action problem is central to the inter-organizational development of flexible capital designs. We conclude by discussing how inter-organizational collectives can better exploit the value of design flexibility at the project front-end.
KW - collective action, design, flexibility, infrastructure, capital projects
M3 - Article
SN - 0018-9391
JO - I E E E Transactions on Engineering Management
JF - I E E E Transactions on Engineering Management
ER -