TY - UNPB
T1 - Competition in the health care market: a two-sided approach
AU - Pezzino, Mario
AU - Pignataro, Giacomo
PY - 2008
Y1 - 2008
N2 - Two identical hospitals compete for patients and doctors choosing locations (e.g.specializations) on a Hotelling line, and selecting the quality of the treatment and the salaryfor the doctors. Patients pay the price chosen by a benevolent central planner. Introducingthe presence of cross-group externalities for the patients (i.e. ceteris paribus patients preferthe hospital with the highest number of doctors), we show that in equilibrium hospitalsalways maximally differentiate their services. The regulator, choosing the price, can affectonly the provision of quality that, in equilibrium, may be provided at the socially optimallevel.
AB - Two identical hospitals compete for patients and doctors choosing locations (e.g.specializations) on a Hotelling line, and selecting the quality of the treatment and the salaryfor the doctors. Patients pay the price chosen by a benevolent central planner. Introducingthe presence of cross-group externalities for the patients (i.e. ceteris paribus patients preferthe hospital with the highest number of doctors), we show that in equilibrium hospitalsalways maximally differentiate their services. The regulator, choosing the price, can affectonly the provision of quality that, in equilibrium, may be provided at the socially optimallevel.
KW - price regulation, quality competition, spatial competition, gatekeeping
M3 - Working paper
T3 - University of Catania, Economics
BT - Competition in the health care market: a two-sided approach
ER -