Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |
Editors | E.N. Zalta |
ISBN (Electronic) | 1095-5054 |
Publication status | Published - 2019 |
Abstract
The basic idea of counterfactual theories of causation is that the meaning of causal claims can be explained in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the form “If A had not occurred, C would not have occurred”. Most counterfactual analyses have focused on claims of the form “event c caused event e”, describing ‘singular’ or ‘token’ or ‘actual’ causation. Such analyses have become popular since the development in the 1970s of possible world semantics for counterfactuals. The best-known counterfactual analysis of causation is David Lewis’s (1973b) theory. However, intense discussion over forty years has cast doubt on the adequacy of any simple analysis of singular causation in terms of counterfactuals. Recent years have seen a proliferation of different refinements of the basic idea; the ‘structural equations’ or ‘causal modelling’ framework is currently the most popular way of cashing out the relationship between causation and counterfactuals.