Deflationism, conceptual explanation, and the truth asymmetry

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Ascriptions of truth give rise to an explanatory asymmetry. For instance, we accept ‘ is true because Rex is barking’ but reject ‘Rex is barking because is true’. Benjamin Schnieder and other philosophers have recently proposed a fresh explanation of this asymmetry: they have suggested that the asymmetry has a conceptual rather than a metaphysical source. The main business of this paper is to assess this proposal, both on its own terms and as an option for deflationists. I offer a pair of objections to the proposal and defend them from counter-objections. To conclude, I discuss how else to explain the asymmetry, and set out the implications for deflationism and correspondence theories of truth.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)84-101
JournalPhilosophical Quarterly
Issue number262
Publication statusPublished - 2016


  • truth, conceptual explanation, grounding, deflationism, correspondence theory


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