Disproportional control rights and debt maturity  

Ning Gao, Wei Jiang, Jiaxu Jin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Using a hand-collected sample of U.S. dual-class firms, we find that corporate debt maturity increases in insiders' disproportional control rights, which is robust to several robustness tests. This relation is more pronounced among firms more vulnerable to control disruption. Besides, firms with greater disproportional control rights issue more long-term new debt. Further analysis of the stock market reaction to new debt issuance shows that controlling insiders' preference for long-term debt benefits outside shareholders. Overall, our findings suggest that the benefits of minimizing control disruption surpass the costs of long-term debt in insider-controlled firms.
Original languageEnglish
Article number102434
JournalInternational Review of Financial Analysis
Early online date17 Nov 2022
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2023


  • Controlling shareholders
  • Debt maturity structure
  • Disproportional control rights
  • Dual-class shares


Dive into the research topics of 'Disproportional control rights and debt maturity  '. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this