Distributive Politics with Other-Regarding Preferences

Alejandro Saporiti, Yizhi Wang, Minh Tung Le

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

We extend upon the results of Lindbeck and Weibull [Public Choice 52 (3), 1987] to study distributive politics when voters have not only self-interested preferences, but also other-regarding concerns. We consider a broad family of other-regarding behavior (including fairness preferences, income-dependent altruism, and inequality aversion), for which results on equilibrium existence and optimality have not been established yet. We provide a sufficient condition for smooth and non-smooth payoffs that generalizes Lindbeck and Weibull's condition, and guarantees the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In addition, we determine conditions under which the equilibrium results in an income distribution that can be rationalised as the outcome of maximizing a mixture of a "self-regarding utilitarian" social welfare function and society's other-regarding preferences.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationManchester, UK
PublisherSocial Science Research Network
Pages1-16
Number of pages16
Publication statusUnpublished - 2018

Keywords

  • Redistribution
  • Other-Regarding Preferences
  • Non-smooth Optimization

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