Divine Hiddenness and Divine Irresistibility

J. L. Schellenberg’s divine hiddenness argument contends that, necessarily, the existence of non-resistant non-belief is incompatible with the existence of a perfectly loving God. I will argue, contra Schellenberg, that it is epistemically possible that non-resistant non-belief is compatible with the existence of a perfectly loving God. As I will argue, were God to fully reveal himself, God would be irresistible, and that presents a problem for humans freely (in a libertarian sense) entering into a relationship with God. Given that it is epistemically possible that libertarian free will is required in order for a personal divine-human relationship to be inaugurated, it is epistemically possible that God has justifiable reason to partially hide himself, even if the result of such hiddenness is the occurrence of non-resistant non-belief. I will conclude by demonstrating why Schellenberg’s previous rejection of this conclusion as not epistemically possible is unwarranted.