Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?

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Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than a philosophers’ worry—the folk seem to agree!
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2631–2643
Number of pages13
Issue number7
Publication statusPublished - 12 Apr 2017


  • Epistemology
  • Philosophy
  • Epistemic Normativity
  • Epistemic consequentialism
  • Epistemic deontology
  • Experimental philosophy
  • Experimental epistemology


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