Abstract
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 591-611 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 64 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2008 |
Keywords
- Gregarious preferences
- Public goods
- Subgame perfect implementation