Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good

Marco Licalzi, Antonio Nicolò

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper studies efficient and egalitarian allocations over a single heterogeneous and infinitely divisible good. We prove the existence of such allocations using only measure-theoretic arguments. Under the additional assumption of complete information, we identify a sufficient condition on agents' preferences that makes it possible to apply the Pazner-Schmeidler rule for uniquely selecting an efficient egalitarian equivalent allocation. Finally, we exhibit a simple procedure that implements the Pazner-Schmeidler selection in a subgame-perfect equilibrium. © 2008 Springer-Verlag.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)27-45
Number of pages18
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume40
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2009

Keywords

  • Egalitarism
  • Equity
  • Fair division
  • Implementation
  • No-envy

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this