Abstract
This paper studies efficient and egalitarian allocations over a single heterogeneous and infinitely divisible good. We prove the existence of such allocations using only measure-theoretic arguments. Under the additional assumption of complete information, we identify a sufficient condition on agents' preferences that makes it possible to apply the Pazner-Schmeidler rule for uniquely selecting an efficient egalitarian equivalent allocation. Finally, we exhibit a simple procedure that implements the Pazner-Schmeidler selection in a subgame-perfect equilibrium. © 2008 Springer-Verlag.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 27-45 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Economic Theory |
Volume | 40 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2009 |
Keywords
- Egalitarism
- Equity
- Fair division
- Implementation
- No-envy