Epistemology Shmepistemology: Moral Error Theory and Epistemic Expressivism

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Abstract

Some philosophers object to moral error theory by arguing that there a parity between moral and epistemic normativity. They maintain that moral and epistemic error theory stand or fall together, that epistemic error theory falls, and that moral error theory thus falls too. This paper offers a response to this objection on behalf of moral error theorists. I defend the view that moral and epistemic error theory do not stand or fall together by arguing that moral error theory can be sustained alongside epistemic expressivism. This unusual combination of theories can be underpinned by differences in the foundational norms that guide moral and epistemic inquiry. I conclude that the problem of epistemic normativity fails to show that it is compulsory for us to reject moral error theory.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)649
Number of pages669
JournalInquiry
Volume61
Issue number7
Early online date15 Feb 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018

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