ES Risks and Shareholder Voice

Yazhou Ellen He, Bige Kahraman, Michelle Lowry

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We examine whether shareholder votes in environmental and social (ES) proposals are informative about firms’ ES risks. ES proposals are unique in that they nearly always fail. We examine whether mutual funds’ support for these failed proposals contains information about the ES risks that firms face. Higher support in failed ES proposals predicts subsequent ES incidents and the effects of these incidents on shareholder value. Examining the detailed records of fund votes, we find that agency frictions between a group of shareholders contribute to proposal failure.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)4824–4863
Number of pages40
JournalThe Review of Financial Studies
Volume36
Issue number12
Early online date26 May 2023
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2023

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