Evidence Thresholds and the Partiality of Relational Faith

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This commentary shows how Dormandy’s ‘Partiality Norm of Belief for Faith’ can be made compatible with ‘Evidentialism about Faith’. Dormandy takes partiality to involve disrespect toward evidence—where evidence we are partial toward is given undue weight. I propose an alternative where partiality is to require more or less evidence for believing a proposition given the benefits or harms of holding the belief. Rather than disrespecting evidence, this partiality is simply to have variable ‘evidence thresholds’ that are partly set by pragmatic considerations. Evidence is not disrespected; an agent just requires more or less of it on pragmatic grounds.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)86-91
JournalAustralasian Philosophical Review
Early online date1 May 2022
Publication statusPublished - 25 May 2022


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