Evolution, teamwork and collective action: Production targets in the private provision of public goods

David P. Myatt, Chris Wallace

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Collective-action problems arise when private actions generate common consequences; for example, the private provision of a public good. This article asks: what shapes of public-good production function work well when play evolves over time, and hence moves between equilibria? Welfare-maximising public-good production functions yield nothing when combined efforts fall below some threshold but otherwise maximally exploit the production-possibility frontier. They generate multiple equilibria: coordinated teamwork is integral to successful collective actions. Optimal thresholds correspond to the output that individuals who pay all private costs but enjoy only private benefits would be just willing to provide.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)61-90
Number of pages30
JournalEconomic Journal
Volume119
Issue number534
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009

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