Examination of Merricks' Primitivism about Truth

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Trenton Merricks (2007) argues for and defends a novel version of primitivism about truth: being true is a primitive monadic but non-intrinsic property. This examination consists of the following triad: a critical discussion of Merricks’ argument for his view, a rejection of his objection against Paul Horwich’s (1998) minimalist theory of truth, and a direct objection against his view on the grounds that it entails being true is a mysterious and suspicious property. The conclusion is that Merricks’ primitivism should be rejected.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)281-98
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2014


  • Truth
  • Ontology
  • Non-relational Non-intrinsic Properties


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