Abstract
The paper examines corporate governance mechanisms which aim to ensure financial accountability in the context of long-term Public-Private Partnership (PPP) contracts in Britain, and assesses the degree to which they provide taxpayers with control and accountability. The corporate governance arrangements are drawn from the private sector, and therefore downplay the traditional concepts of probity and stewardship, in part due to the British Treasury’s adoption of private sector financial reporting.
The paper draws on Shaoul et al.’s (2012) framework governance-based reporting framework to critique the corporate governance mechanisms of structure, financial reporting, contracts and scrutiny in relation to British PPP projects. It shows that the way these mechanisms are set up means there is a lack of control by the public sector, thus rendering public accountability ineffective.
The paper draws on Shaoul et al.’s (2012) framework governance-based reporting framework to critique the corporate governance mechanisms of structure, financial reporting, contracts and scrutiny in relation to British PPP projects. It shows that the way these mechanisms are set up means there is a lack of control by the public sector, thus rendering public accountability ineffective.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Australian Journal of Public Administration |
Volume | 76 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 11 Sept 2017 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2017 |