Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games

Wei He, Nicholas C. Yannelis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We provide easily-verifiable sufficient conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game to guarantee the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayes–Nash equilibrium. We allow players' payoff functions to be discontinuous in actions, and illustrate the usefulness of our results via an example of an all-pay auction with general tie-breaking rules which cannot be handled by extant results.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)181-194
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2016


  • Discontinuous Bayesian game
  • Behavioral strategy
  • Random disjoint payoff matching
  • Equilibrium existence
  • All-pay auction


Dive into the research topics of 'Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this