Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games

Wei He; Nicholas C. Yannelis

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.009

Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games

Wei He, Nicholas C. Yannelis

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We provide easily-verifiable sufficient conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game to guarantee the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayes–Nash equilibrium. We allow players' payoff functions to be discontinuous in actions, and illustrate the usefulness of our results via an example of an all-pay auction with general tie-breaking rules which cannot be handled by extant results.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	181-194
Number of pages	14
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	162
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.009
Publication status	Published - Mar 2016

Keywords

Discontinuous Bayesian game
Behavioral strategy
Random disjoint payoff matching
Equilibrium existence
All-pay auction

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10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.009

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title = "Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games",

abstract = "We provide easily-verifiable sufficient conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game to guarantee the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayes–Nash equilibrium. We allow players' payoff functions to be discontinuous in actions, and illustrate the usefulness of our results via an example of an all-pay auction with general tie-breaking rules which cannot be handled by extant results.",

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AU - Yannelis, Nicholas C.

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AB - We provide easily-verifiable sufficient conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game to guarantee the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayes–Nash equilibrium. We allow players' payoff functions to be discontinuous in actions, and illustrate the usefulness of our results via an example of an all-pay auction with general tie-breaking rules which cannot be handled by extant results.

KW - Discontinuous Bayesian game

KW - Behavioral strategy

KW - Random disjoint payoff matching

KW - Equilibrium existence

KW - All-pay auction

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DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.009

M3 - Article

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VL - 162

SP - 181

EP - 194

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

ER -

Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games

Abstract

Keywords

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