Existential Soft Determinism: Kierkegaard on Predestination, Providence, and Governance

This article examines Kierkegaard’s view of predestination, providence, and governance in terms of the determinism versus free will debate. After outlining the different notions of determinism (‘hard’ and ‘soft’) and the distinction between ‘compatibilism’ and ‘incompatibilism’, the article considers Kierkegaard’s reasons for rejecting the doctrine of predestination and replacing it with the notions of providence (Forsyn) and governance (Styrelse). The article collects Kierkegaard’s scattered remarks on providence and governance and (1) identifies the ways in which they on the one hand overlap and on the other hand differ from each other and (2) combines Kierkegaard’s reflections to form a coherent theory of divine providence. For Kierkegaard, God does not compel human beings to implement his divine plan, but creatively makes use of their freely made decisions to achieve his providential purpose. The article concludes that Kierkegaard has existentialized the doctrine of providence by shifting it from its traditional location in the doctrines of God and creation into the sphere of the single individual's personal relationship with God. In doing so, Kierkegaard demonstrates that he is a compatibilist who has advanced what could be described as ‘existential soft determinism’.