If philosophers aren't using intuitions as evidence, what are they doing?

Philosophy

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2025
Intuition-denial and methods teaching: prediction, reform, and complication
Andow, J., 4 Mar 2025, In: Metaphilosophy.
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Open Access
2023
Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think)
Andow, J., 3 Jul 2023, In: Inquiry. 66, 6, p. 1036-1068 33 p.
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2019
Why Don’t Philosophers Do Their Intuition Practice?
Andow, J., 29 Sept 2019, In: Acta Analytica. p. 257–269 13 p.
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Open Access
2017
A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux
Andow, J., 16 Jan 2017, In: Metaphilosophy. 48, 1-2, p. 183-195 13 p.
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Open Access
2016
Abduction by Philosophers: Reorienting Philosophical Methodology
Andow, J., 8 Jul 2016, In: Metaphilosophy. 47, 3, p. 353-370 18 p.
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2015
Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions
Andow, J., 6 May 2015, In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 7, 1, p. 105-125 21 p.
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Open Access
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