Abstract
Restrictionism is a response to the Liar and other paradoxes concerning truth. Restrictionists—as I will call proponents of the strategy—respond to these paradoxes by giving up instances of the schema
<p> is true iff p.
My aim is to show that the current unpopularity of restrictionism is undeserved. I will argue that, whilst cautious versions of the strategy may face serious problems, a radical and previously overlooked version of restrictionism provides a strong and defensible response to the paradoxes.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 3–25 |
| Journal | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
| Volume | 98 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 7 Apr 2017 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2019 |