Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets

Antonio Nicolo, Antonio Nicolò, Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We analyze centralized housing markets under the existence of feasibility constraints on the number of agents and objects involved in the exchanges. We focus on an incomplete information setting where only the information about how each agent ranks her endowment is private. We show that under non-degenerate ex-ante probability distributions over preference profiles, no rule satisfies the joint requirements of individual rationality, (constrained) efficiency, and ordinally Bayesian incentive compatibility.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)625-635
Number of pages10
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume41
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2013

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this