Inconsequentialism and Climate Action

In the context of climate change, I attempt to resolve the problem of inconsequentialism—the ‘no-effect’ view—by motivating a sense of individual obligation for non-collective action in collective impact cases. Inconsequentialism is an offshoot of the problem of collective impact, which sometimes justifies acting in morally problematic and consequentially harmful ways based on the presumed insignificant possibility of one’s actions making a positive difference, collectively. The idea that, as individuals, our choices and actions would have little to no effect on the general scheme of things, particularly in resolving collective harm problems, is one of the biggest challenges facing global climate action today. To engage this problem, I first establish what constitutes the problem of collective impact and the no-effect view in topical philosophical debates. I then consider some responses to the no-effect view and why they fail to motivate non-collective climate action. Finally, I present an underexplored African-inspired complementary approach to resolving the problem of inconsequentialism to motivate non-collective action against global climate change.