Abstract
Using a sample of UK firms, we find that institutional block-holding is negatively associated with directors' ownership and is positively associated with board composition, suggesting that institutional block-holders regard directors' ownership and board composition as substitute and complementary control mechanisms, respectively. We also show that UK institutional block-holders prefer smaller firms and firms with a shorter listing history. The presence of institutional block-holders is associated with smaller boards and lower trading liquidity. Finally, our results indicate that the investment preference of UK institutional block-holders varies with the level of their shareholding. © 2011 Taylor & Francis.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 133-152 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | European Journal of Finance |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2011 |
Keywords
- Board structure
- Corporate governance
- Directors'ownership
- Institutional block-holding