@techreport{5a0bd750b78f4d2e8e4a4b2ebcb02989,
title = "International Environmental Agreements with Uncertainty, Learning and Risk Aversion",
abstract = "Uncertainty and learning play an important role for the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs). For instance, scientific uncertainty about climate damages and technological abatement and mitigations options is still large despite ongoing research. It has been shown that in the strategic context of voluntary participation but strong free-rider incentives, learning may have a negative impact on the success of IEAs. This paper extends the model of Kolstad (2007) and Kolstad and Ulph (2008) by considering risk aversion. This seems suggestive as uncertainties in climate change are highly correlated and hence pooling risks may be limited. It is shown that the negative conclusion with respect to the role of learning derived for risk neutrality has to be qualified.",
keywords = "international environmental agreements, uncertainty, learning and risk-aversion, game theory",
author = "Michael Finus and Pintassilgo Pedro and Alistair Ulph",
note = "AcknowledgementsThis report presents independent research commissioned by the Sustainable Consumption Institute (SCI). The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the SCI, the funders or The University of Manchester.Publication AddressSustainable Consumption InstituteThe University of Manchester188 Waterloo PlaceOxford RoadManchester M13 9PL (T) 0161 275 4030(F) 0161 275 0188www.sci.manchester.ac.uk",
year = "2010",
month = jul,
language = "English",
series = "SCI discussion paper",
publisher = "Sustainable Consumption Institute",
number = "6",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Sustainable Consumption Institute",
}
