Abstract
Experimental philosophers have empirically challenged the connection between intuition and philosophical expertise. This paper reviews these challenges alongside other research findings in cognitive science on expert performance and argues for three claims. First, evidence taken to challenge philosophical expertise may also be explained by the well‐researched failures and limitations of genuine expertise. Second, studying the failures and limitations of experts across many fields provides a promising research program upon which to base a new model of philosophical expertise. Third, a model of philosophical expertise based on the limitations of genuine experts may suggest a series of constraints on the reliability of professional philosophical intuition.
| Original language | English |
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| Pages (from-to) | 378-410 |
| Journal | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
| Volume | 92 |
| Early online date | 14 Oct 2014 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2016 |