Is ontological revisionism uncharitable?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Some philosophers (‘nihilists’) deny the existence of composite material objects. Other philosophers (‘universalists’) hold that whenever there are some things, they compose something. The purpose of this paper is to scrutinize an objection to these revisionary views: the objection that nihilism and universalism are both unacceptably uncharitable because each of them implies that a great deal of what we ordinarily believe is false. Our main business is to show how nihilism and universalism can be defended against the objection. A secondary point is that universalism is harder to defend than nihilism.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)405–425
Number of pages21
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Early online date13 Jun 2016
Publication statusPublished - 2016


Dive into the research topics of 'Is ontological revisionism uncharitable?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this