Kontrol Demokratis atas Komunitas Intelijen di Filipina dan Indonesia

Intelligence is the first line of defence, which serves to avoid strategic adversaries and provide recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders. In a democratic country, principles such as accountability, transparency, and upholding human rights, become an encounter in the principle of intelligence confidentiality. Especially in post-authoritarianism countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia, intelligence is used as a means of perpetuating
the regime, rather than national security instruments. Therefore, democratic control in the form of supervision of the intelligence community is necessary. This paper identifies the oversight of the intelligence community in the
Philippines and Indonesia. The theory used is Peter Gill's control or oversight model, which identifies forms of control, institutions of control, and institutions of oversight in the internal agency, the executive branch, other state agencies, and civil society groups. Data collection is from interviews and literature documentation searches. The results of this study are: (1) the Philippines does not yet have an adequate legal footing and monitoring tools to ensure that intelligence budget and performance is accountable and transparent; (2) Indonesia is weak in the implementation of oversight even though it already has adequate tools; (3) Civil society groups in both countries must be encouraged to play an essential role in the public oversight function. Both countries can learn from each other. The Philippines can learn from Indonesia because it has adequate regulatory mechanisms, while Indonesia needs to have a rigid national architecture and security strategy so that BIN is not directly under the President.