Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity

Pendaran Roberts, James Andow, Kelly Ann Schmidtke

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Recent empirical work on non-philosophers’ intuitions about epistemic normativity reveals patterns that cannot be fully accounted for by direct epistemic consequentialism. On the basis of these results, one might picture participants as “epistemic deontologists.” We present the results of two new experiments that support a more nuanced picture. We examine intuitions about guesses and hypotheses, and about beliefs. Our results suggest a two-factor model of intuitions, wherein both consequentialist and non-consequentialist considerations affect participants’ judgments about epistemic permissibility.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3267-3287
Number of pages21
JournalSynthese
Volume195
Issue number7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 29 Mar 2017

Keywords

  • Epistemic Normativity
  • Epistemic Permissibility
  • Deontic Theory
  • Epistemic Act
  • Epistemic Acceptability
  • Philosophy
  • Epistemology
  • Experimental Philosophy
  • Experimental epistemology
  • Epistemic Consequentialism
  • Epistemic Deontology

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this