Liking That It Hurts: The Case of the Masochist and Second-Order Desire Accounts of Pain’s Unpleasantness

Jonathan Mitchell

Liking That It Hurts: The Case of the Masochist and Second-Order Desire Accounts of Pain’s Unpleasantness

Jonathan Mitchell

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Recent work on pain focuses on the question ‘what makes pains unpleasant’. SOD views claim that the unpleasantness of pain consists in a second-order intrinsic desire that the pain experience itself cease or stop. This paper considers a significant objection to SOD views by considering the case of the masochist. It is argued that various ways in which the SOD view might try to account for the case of the masochist encounter problems. The conclusion is that until we have a convincing explanation of how SOD views can handle masochistic psychology, then we should look elsewhere for an account of pains unpleasantness.

Original language	English
Journal	American Philosophical Quarterly
Publication status	Accepted/In press - 1 Aug 2020

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Liking That It Hurts- The Case of the Masochist and Second-Order Desire Accounts of Pain’s Unpleasantness (JM DRAFT)
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AB - Recent work on pain focuses on the question ‘what makes pains unpleasant’. SOD views claim that the unpleasantness of pain consists in a second-order intrinsic desire that the pain experience itself cease or stop. This paper considers a significant objection to SOD views by considering the case of the masochist. It is argued that various ways in which the SOD view might try to account for the case of the masochist encounter problems. The conclusion is that until we have a convincing explanation of how SOD views can handle masochistic psychology, then we should look elsewhere for an account of pains unpleasantness.

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Liking That It Hurts: The Case of the Masochist and Second-Order Desire Accounts of Pain’s Unpleasantness

Abstract

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