Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement

David Delacrétaz, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexander Teytelboym

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of refugee families and the capacities of communities. We propose four refugee resettlement mechanisms and two solution concepts that can be used in refugee resettlement matching under various institutional and informational constraints. Our theoretical results and simulations using refugee resettlement data suggest that preference-based matching mechanisms can improve match efficiency, respect priorities of communities, and incentivize refugees to report where they would prefer to settle.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2689-2717
Number of pages29
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume113
Issue number10
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 10 Oct 2023

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