TY - JOUR
T1 - Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement
AU - Delacrétaz, David
AU - Kominers, Scott Duke
AU - Teytelboym, Alexander
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 American Economic Association. All rights reserved.
PY - 2023/10/10
Y1 - 2023/10/10
N2 - Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of refugee families and the capacities of communities. We propose four refugee resettlement mechanisms and two solution concepts that can be used in refugee resettlement matching under various institutional and informational constraints. Our theoretical results and simulations using refugee resettlement data suggest that preference-based matching mechanisms can improve match efficiency, respect priorities of communities, and incentivize refugees to report where they would prefer to settle.
AB - Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of refugee families and the capacities of communities. We propose four refugee resettlement mechanisms and two solution concepts that can be used in refugee resettlement matching under various institutional and informational constraints. Our theoretical results and simulations using refugee resettlement data suggest that preference-based matching mechanisms can improve match efficiency, respect priorities of communities, and incentivize refugees to report where they would prefer to settle.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85173248935&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/4b98c18c-6643-31c9-a14a-2cc5b2551d7c/
U2 - 10.1257/aer.20210096
DO - 10.1257/aer.20210096
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85173248935
SN - 0002-8282
VL - 113
SP - 2689
EP - 2717
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
IS - 10
ER -