TY - GEN
T1 - Minting Mechanism for Proof of Stake Blockchains
AU - Deuber, Dominic
AU - Döttling, Nico
AU - Magri, Bernardo
AU - Malavolta, Giulio
AU - Thyagarajan, Sri Aravinda Krishnan
N1 - Funding Information:
This paper is part of the work of the Nuremberg Campus of Technology, a research cooperation of Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg (FAU) and Tech-nischen Hochschule Nürnberg Georg Simon Ohm, supported by the state of Bavaria. The full version of this work can be found at https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1110.
Funding Information:
This paper is part of the work of the Nuremberg Campus of Technology, a research cooperation of Friedrich-Alexander-Universit?t Erlangen-N?rnberg (FAU) and Tech-nischen Hochschule N?rnberg Georg Simon Ohm, supported by the state of Bavaria.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - As an alternative for the computational waste generated by proof-of-work (PoW) blockchains, proof-of-stake (PoS) systems gained a lot of popularity, being adopted by many existing cryptocurrencies. Unfortunately, as we show, PoS-based currencies, where newly minted coins are assigned to the slot leader, inevitably incentivises coin hoarding, as players maximise their utility by holding their stakes and not trading. As a result, existing PoS-based cryptocurrencies do not mimic the properties of fiat currencies, but are rather regarded as investment vectors. In this work we initiate the study of minting mechanisms in cryptocurrencies as a primitive on its own right, and as a first step to a solution to mitigate coin hoarding in PoS currencies we propose a novel minting mechanism based on waiting-time first-price auctions. Our main technical tool is a protocol to run an auction over any blockchain. Moreover, our protocol is the first to securely implement an auction without requiring a semi-trusted party, i.e., where every miner in the network is a potential bidder. Our approach is generically applicable and we show that it is incentive-compatible with the underlying blockchain, i.e., the best strategy for a player is to behave honestly. Our proof-of-concept implementation shows that our system is efficient and scales to tens of thousands of bidders.
AB - As an alternative for the computational waste generated by proof-of-work (PoW) blockchains, proof-of-stake (PoS) systems gained a lot of popularity, being adopted by many existing cryptocurrencies. Unfortunately, as we show, PoS-based currencies, where newly minted coins are assigned to the slot leader, inevitably incentivises coin hoarding, as players maximise their utility by holding their stakes and not trading. As a result, existing PoS-based cryptocurrencies do not mimic the properties of fiat currencies, but are rather regarded as investment vectors. In this work we initiate the study of minting mechanisms in cryptocurrencies as a primitive on its own right, and as a first step to a solution to mitigate coin hoarding in PoS currencies we propose a novel minting mechanism based on waiting-time first-price auctions. Our main technical tool is a protocol to run an auction over any blockchain. Moreover, our protocol is the first to securely implement an auction without requiring a semi-trusted party, i.e., where every miner in the network is a potential bidder. Our approach is generically applicable and we show that it is incentive-compatible with the underlying blockchain, i.e., the best strategy for a player is to behave honestly. Our proof-of-concept implementation shows that our system is efficient and scales to tens of thousands of bidders.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85091305827&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-57808-4_16
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-57808-4_16
M3 - Conference contribution
SN - 9783030578077
VL - 12146
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 315
EP - 334
BT - Applied Cryptography and Network Security - 18th International Conference, ACNS 2020, Proceedings
A2 - Conti, Mauro
A2 - Zhou, Jianying
A2 - Casalicchio, Emiliano
A2 - Spognardi, Angelo
PB - Springer Berlin
ER -