Modal fictionalism and possible-worlds discourse

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The Brock-Rosen problem has been one of the most thoroughly discussed objections to the modal fictionalism bruited in Gideon Rosen's 'Modal Fictionalism'. But there is a more fundamental problem with modal fictionalism, at least as it is normally explained: the position does not resolve the tension that motivated it. I argue that if we pay attention to a neglected aspect of modal fictionalism, we will see how to resolve this tension-and we will also find a persuasive reply to the Brock-Rosen objection. Finally, I discuss an alternative reading of Rosen, and argue that this position is also able to fend off the Brock-Rosen objection. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)151-160
Number of pages9
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2008


  • Brock-Rosen objection
  • Fictionalism
  • Modality
  • Possible world


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